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 The Borders that Disadvantage Migrant Women  
in Enjoying Human Rights 
 
Lourdes Peroni

 
 
This article launches a frame to investigate the inequalities underlying the human 
rights violations migrant women may experience. Drawing on intersectionality theory 
and on Ratna Kapur's concept of ‘normative boundaries of belonging’, the article 
puts forward the notion of ‘intersecting borders of inequality’. The notion 
interrogates three types of borders that may construe migrant women as outsiders or 
lesser members in society: formal, normative and practical borders. The article 
demonstrates that scrutinising the ways in which these borders intersect illuminates 
some of the structures disadvantaging migrant women and invites imagining wider 
responses to tackle these disadvantages. To illustrate these arguments, the article 
uses examples of the European Court of Human Rights’ case law.  
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1. INTRODUCTION   
 
In producing or reinforcing ‘relations of dependency and power’ through immigration 
controls,
1
 States may disadvantage migrant women in enjoying human rights and 
engender conditions ripe for human rights abuses. Think of immigration norms that 
make domestic workers – who in practice are often women – dependent on their 
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employers for legal status.
2
 Employers may take advantage of the dependent or 
precarious status produced by immigration norms to control and exploit domestic 
workers.
3
 
Recent human rights scholarship has investigated whether, to what extent, and 
how international human rights law may tackle the inequalities underlying this kind of 
human rights abuses. Human rights scholars have discussed the role of immigration 
norms and practice in creating or aggravating these inequalities as well as the 
(in)capacity of international human rights law to challenge these norms and practice.
4
 
Importantly, some of these scholars have exposed the gendered nature of immigration 
norms regulating migrant women’s relations in different spheres, including work and 
family relations.
5
  
Building on these scholarly efforts, this article interrogates how the borders 
sustained by immigration controls intersect with other borders to disadvantage 
migrant women in their enjoyment of human rights. In particular, it scrutinises the 
borders that formally, normatively, and practically construe migrant women as 
outsiders or lesser members in society. In making these arguments, the article borrows 
Ratna Kapur’s notion of ‘normative boundaries of belonging’.6 These boundaries are 
sustained by dominant societal assumptions about sexuality, family and culture that 
inform law’s responses to migrants.7 The arguments further draw on intersectionality 
theory,
8
 understood as interacting structures of inequality (for example, sexism, 
racism, immigration norms) rather than as interacting categories of identity (for 
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example, sex, race, migration status).
9
 It is therefore ‘structural intersectionality’10 
that informs the arguments in this article.  
The article demonstrates that the notion of intersecting borders of inequality 
has the ability to put disadvantaging structures front and centre in the analysis of 
migrant women’s human rights claims. The notion does not only illuminate the 
State’s role in creating, reproducing and reinforcing these structures. It additionally 
opens up a wider set of responses to tackle the State’s contributory role to 
disadvantage. To illustrate how intersecting borders of inequality may work in 
practice, the article uses cases of the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR or 
the Court) as examples. 
 
2. ‘INTERSECTING BORDERS OF INEQUALITY’  
 
This part introduces the notion of ‘intersecting borders of inequality’ as a lens to see 
and challenge the disadvantages underlying the violations of migrant women’s human 
rights. The notion does not take identity categories such as sex, race, and migration 
status as the starting point in the human rights analysis. Rather, it turns the 
disadvantaging structures themselves into points of departure.
11
  For example, the 
focus is not sex but sexism, not migration status but immigration norms. Through the 
lens of intersecting borders, the analytical gaze thus starts moving outwards-inwards: 
from the disadvantaging structures to the individual. Only then does it move inwards-
outwards and may continue moving back and forth. The individual, therefore, does 
not disappear from the scene but is viewed in context.  
Locating the analytical point of departure in the structures themselves offers 
several benefits. It ensures that the human rights analysis does not get stuck on 
individual attributes, identity or group characteristics. In so doing, it encourages 
interrogating what may be wrong in society and its institutions rather than what may 
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be ‘wrong’ with the group or individual.12 The approach thus facilitates scrutinising 
something feminists like Martha Fineman advocate for interrogating: the role of the 
State in (re)producing vulnerability and disadvantage.
13
 It additionally escapes falling 
into stigmatising views of vulnerability and disadvantage.
14
 In making structures the 
starting point of the inquiry, the proposed lens shows how vulnerability and 
disadvantage are societally shaped and not natural attributes of certain individuals or 
fixed identity dimensions of certain groups. As migration scholars put it, ‘migrants 
are not naturally vulnerable; rather the state is deeply implicated in constructing 
vulnerability through immigration controls and practices’.15  
To see these disadvantaging structures, the notion of borders is analytically 
useful because it suggests something that lies outside the individual or group and 
thereby directs the gaze outwards. Moreover, borders evoke in their most basic sense 
lines and divisions through which ‘[h]ierarchies of belonging and of exclusion’16 may 
be created, reproduced or reinforced. Borders are not here understood as territorially 
fixed lines.
17
 They are understood as shifting and as following and surrounding people 
inside State territory.
18
 The language of borders, moreover, has a strong symbolic 
appeal in the sphere of migration. After all, border control seems to be the core 
business of immigration norms and practice.  
The borders that may most obviously disadvantage migrant women are formal 
borders, which are here understood as State norms and practices establishing the 
conditions of entry and stay
19
 as well as the requirements of formal citizenship. These 
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borders do not operate only at the territorial edges of a State.
20
 They operate beyond 
these edges, both outside and inside State territory.
21
 They follow people inside,
22
 as 
they try to access employment, health care, education and justice.
23
 Formal borders 
thus create, police, and enforce people’s migration statuses. Migration status, in turn, 
delineates not just entry and residence rights but also rights in family, work, political 
and economic spheres.
24
  
Borders in this formal sense, however, are not the only ones that may limit 
human rights enjoyment for migrant women. In fact, formal borders may not always 
come into play. Immigration norms or practice may authorise a woman to enter, 
reside, and work in another State territory temporarily or permanently. Yet the limited 
advantages that these formal borders allow
25
 will not necessarily shield her from the 
disadvantages other borders may cause.
26
 Formal borders may intersect with other 
borders, including practical ones. Practical borders, for present purposes, are those 
that arise from the factual reality of migrating. Examples include lack of (or limited) 
social networks in the receiving State and language skills different from those of the 
majority in this State. 
Formal borders may also intersect with subtle borders that are difficult to spot. 
Kapur’s notion of ‘normative boundaries of belonging’ offers an insightful lens to 
recognise these subtle borders. According to Kapur, conformity or non-conformity 
with dominant societal assumptions about sexuality, family, and culture draws the 
lines between ‘belonging and non-belonging’ and renders some people non- or lesser 
members of society’.27 To use one of her examples: normative sexuality may be 
‘heterosexual, marital, monogamous, reproductive, and non-commercial’. 28  Those 
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whose sexuality deviates from these normative expectations are more likely to be 
denied the rights and benefits linked to citizenship.
29
 
The next parts illustrate the ways in which intersecting borders facilitates 
recognising the inequalities underlying the human rights violations migrant women 
complain of. ECtHR cases are used for illustrative purposes. In nearly all these cases, 
the ECtHR finds in the applicants’ favour. In some of these cases, it acknowledges 
some structural barriers (especially formal borders). Despite recognising some of the 
barriers underlying the violations, the recognition is rather ad hoc and tends to miss 
the practical and normative borders as well as the intersections between them.  
This article does not, however, aim to make generalisable descriptive claims 
or to critique the Court’s approach in its case law concerning migrant women. Nor 
does it intend to offer a comprehensive analysis of this area of the ECtHR’s case law. 
The aim, rather, is to use these cases to illustrate the normative benefits of applying an 
intersecting borders frame in human rights analysis. As the examples below 
demonstrate, the frame gives a fuller and more systematic picture of the intersecting 
disadvantages migrant women may experience and of the State’s role in creating, 
reproducing or reinforcing these disadvantages. The examples further show that, as a 
result, intersecting borders may help to identify additional human rights violations, to 
develop State obligations with transformative potential or to refine the content and 
scope of already developed ones. 
 
3. THE BORDERS BEHIND INDIVIDUAL ‘CHOICE’ AND ‘FAILURE’ 
 
Through the cases discussed below, this part shows how, viewed through the lens of 
intersecting borders, migrant women’s (in)abilities are not merely the result of their 
personal choices or failures. Their individual (in)abilities, rather, are shaped by 
different inequality structures sometimes created, reproduced or reinforced by the 
State.  
 
3.1. BEYOND PERSONAL CHOICE  
 
                                                        
29
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Inattention to the role of intersecting borders may lead to blaming the migrant woman 
entirely for the disadvantage she experiences while deflecting the blame from the 
State. Haydarie and Others v. the Netherlands illustrates how this blindness serves to 
construe the applicant’s disadvantage as her choice.30 The case involved an Afghan 
woman legally residing in the Netherlands with one of her children and with her 
disabled sister.
31
 The Dutch authorities rejected her request to reunite with three of 
her other children because she lacked the independent income required by 
immigration rules to support her children (she relied on welfare benefits).
32
 The 
domestic authorities would have not maintained the income requirement in her case 
had she made ‘serious efforts’ to secure a job during a period of three years since she 
became entitled to work.
33
 At Strasbourg, one of the applicant’s claims was that, in 
assessing her situation, the Dutch authorities had failed to give weight to her ‘unpaid 
care labour’ for her sister.34 In declaring her Article 8 ECHR claim inadmissible, the 
ECtHR notes that the applicant had not applied for any jobs and instead ‘preferred to 
care for her wheel-chair bound sister at home’.35 The Court adds that she could have 
entrusted ‘the care of her sister to an agency’.36  
In assessing whether the applicant had made ‘serious efforts’ to find a job, 
both the domestic authorities and the ECtHR reproduce a normative border and ignore 
a practical one. They reproduce the normative border that assumes that unpaid care 
work is inactive and unproductive. As feminist scholarship has shown, these borders 
are gendered given that caretaking continues to be largely performed by women.
37
 
Fulvia Staiano insightfully explains the assumptions at play in Haydarie: ‘Unpaid 
care work … was considered by the national authorities not only as synonymous with 
inactivity and passiveness, but also as mere choice to personally carry out tasks which 
could well be outsourced to aid-providing bodies’.38 Under these assumptions, care 
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work is therefore viewed as ‘a free choice not to perform actual work.’39 Carers, in 
turn, are viewed as ‘willingly inactive individuals […] unworthy of accessing rights 
and entitlements reserved to those devoted to “actual” work’. 40  
Recognising the State’s role in reproducing these normative borders will 
probably not lead to border-dismantling demands on States. A supranational human 
rights court, in particular, may understand that it is for States to determine what 
counts as work for migration purposes. Yet awareness of the State’s role in 
reproducing such gendered borders may encourage imagining alternative, less 
intrusive demands. States, for example, may be asked to justify the application of 
these borders in the particular case.
41
 If unjustified, they may be requested to mitigate 
the disparate consequences on the individual caretaker. States may be further 
demanded a procedural obligation: to consider the effects of not regarding care as 
proper work on the individual (female) caretaker/job seeker. In fact, an objective and 
complete assessment of Haydarie-like circumstances cannot ignore these effects. As 
Fineman argues, ‘[c]aretaking labor interferes with the pursuit and development of 
wage labor options. Caretaking labor saps energy and efforts from investment in 
career or market activities, those things that produce economic rewards’.42 
The other border operating to condition Haydarie’s efforts to find a job is the 
practical border of language. The State tacitly reinforces this practical border by 
ignoring its disadvantageous impact on an individual’s job search efforts. The active 
attitude that the State expected from the applicant assumes that she already speaks the 
language. The ‘serious efforts’ required from her included actively looking for work, 
registering at employment agencies, responding to vacancy openings, writing job 
applications, and carrying out ‘labour-market oriented studies’.43 The State further 
reinforces the practical border by ignoring the applicant’s language efforts in order ‘to 
improve her chances on the labour market’.44 Four months after Haydarie became 
entitled to work, she had passed a first Dutch exam and nine months later another 
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one.
45
 In becoming aware of the operation of this type of border, supranational human 
rights adjudicators may demand procedural State obligations. States may be asked to 
assess whether the language barrier conditions the individual job-search attitude and 
whether individual efforts to overcome the language barrier count towards ‘serious 
efforts’ to find a job. 
 
3.2. BEYOND PERSONAL FAILURE 
 
Inattention to the intersecting borders at work may also lead to understanding migrant 
women’s disadvantages as the result of their personal failure. In the first two cases 
now discussed – Moser v. Austria46 and Soares de Melo v. Portugal47 – the States cast 
the women as responsible for the inadequate material conditions that endangered their 
children’s welfare. In these two cases, the States create and enforce formal borders. In 
turn, these formal borders interact with practical borders reinforced by the Austrian 
State and with normative borders reproduced by the Portuguese State. The interacting 
borders serve to justify drastic State intervention: removal of the children from their 
mothers. In the third case examined under this sub-heading, Zhou v. Italy,
48
 formal 
borders are not work. However, practical borders are reinforced and normative 
borders reproduced by the State. The interaction of these borders serves to construe 
the woman as parentally incapable and to justify similar radical interference with her 
right to family life.  
The applicant in Soares de Melo was a national of Cape Verde.
49
 She was 
unemployed and virtually the sole caretaker of ten children, as the father was often 
absent from the household.
50
 Following her failure to comply with an agreement 
reached with the Children and Youth Protection Commission,
51
 seven of her youngest 
children were placed in different institutions with a view to adoption.
52
 The agreement 
included obligations to look for a job, to improve her children’s housing conditions 
and send them to school, to regularise her status in Portugal and to undergo 
                                                        
45
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sterilisation.
53
 The applicant in Moser, in turn, was a Serbian national authorised to 
live and work in Austria until 1997.
54
 In 1999, however, a five-year residence 
prohibition was issued against her for illegal employment.
55
 Later on the same year, 
she married an Austrian national and, around six months later, gave birth to a child 
who was separated from her and whose biological father was allegedly not her 
husband.
56
 The child’s custody was transferred to a welfare institution and his care 
entrusted to foster parents
57
 because the applicant lacked adequate accommodation, 
financial means and a clear residence status.
58
  
In both Soares de Melo and Moser, the ECtHR found in favour of the 
applicants’ Article 8 ECHR right to respect for family life. The lack of response by 
social services to Soares de Melo’s material distress and the introduction of 
sterilization as a condition to keep her parental rights influenced the Court’s decision 
against Portugal.
59
 The ruling against Austria followed the Court’s finding of several 
failings at the domestic level. The Austrian authorities failed to consider all possible 
alternatives to custody transferring; to ensure regular contact between the applicant 
and her son following their separation; and to sufficiently involve the applicant in the 
decision-making process.
60
  
In the two cases, formal borders work in a similar way. The Austrian 
authorities understood that Moser’s ‘unstable’ situation ‘was not enhanced by her 
unlawful residence in Austria [that] did not entitle her to financial aid’. 61  The 
Portuguese authorities noted that the irregular status of some members of the Soares 
de Melo family was a barrier to social benefits.
62
 Both the Austrian and Portuguese 
authorities regarded irregular migration statuses as the source of ineligibility for State-
sponsored benefits. Thinking of what is going on in Soares de Melo and Moser from 
the perspective of formal borders reveals that the real source of ineligibility is not the 
applicants’ statuses. The real source is migration law that construes certain categories 
of migrants as irregular and that does not entitle them to certain State-sponsored 
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benefits. From this perspective, the role of the State in reinforcing the applicants’ 
precarious material conditions becomes visible. In rendering them ineligible for State 
support, the Austrian and Portuguese States denied them access to resources that 
might have enabled them to improve these conditions for the children.  
Now, recognising the State’s role in disadvantaging some individuals through 
formal borders may not lead international human rights law to demand States to 
reconsider, let alone dismantle, these borders. Having ‘long been a key site of national 
assertions’,63 migration is a sphere in which States resist human rights demands64 and 
in which international human rights law tends to defer to States.
65
 States are often 
reluctant to acknowledge their contributory role especially in the context of irregular 
migration.
66
 Yet illuminating the State’s role is an important step towards envisaging 
demands that may help alleviate disadvantage. States, for example, may be required to 
justify these borders
67
 and, if unjustified, asked to mitigate their disadvantageous 
impact under certain individual circumstances.  
The latter is what the ECtHR actually does in Soares de Melo and Moser. In 
Soares de Melo, the Court implicitly expected the Portuguese State to have 
substantively addressed the disadvantageous impact of formal borders on the 
applicant. The Portuguese authorities, the Court stated, had not tried to ‘fill in’ 
(‘combler’) the applicant’s material deficiencies by means of additional financial 
assistance aimed at covering the family primary needs and child day care.
68
 In Moser, 
the Court tackled the negative impact procedurally: the Austrian authorities had failed 
to take measures such as ‘clarifying the applicant’s residence status’.69 The demands 
made by the Court in the two cases illustrate ways in which a supranational human 
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68
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rights court may ask States to mitigate the disadvantages created by formal borders 
without asking reconsideration of these borders altogether.  
The formal border in Moser interacts with a practical one: the applicant’s 
scarce family and social support networks. The option of placing the applicant’s child 
with relatives or other persons close to him was not available in her case.
70
 The State 
had not itself put in place this practical border. However, and like in Haydarie, it 
tacitly reinforced the disadvantage created by the lack of social support by ignoring its 
detrimental implications for the individual. States may be required to take into 
account the impact of this practical border on the individual’s capacity to offer 
adequate accommodation to their children. An objective and complete assessment of 
the individual’s circumstances cannot actually ignore this impact. Moreover, Sates 
may be asked to fully assess all possible alternatives before separating the child from 
the parent. In fact, the ECtHR expected the Austrian State to have explored all the 
possibilities that would have enabled the applicant and her son to remain together.
71
 It 
turned out that placement in a mother-child centre was an option legally available to 
them.
72
  
The formal border in Soares de Melo intersects with two normative ones: 
coupled motherhood and nuclear family. These borders construe the applicant’s forms 
of family and mothering as ‘deviant’ and therefore as the ‘wrong’ types of 
arrangements to raise children. According to the Lisbon Court of Appeal, the fact that 
the applicant was separated from the children’s father was ‘enough to show moral 
negligence’.73 The applicant is here negatively judged because she no longer had a 
relationship with the children’s father. The Supreme Court further holds her single-
parent household to the ‘norm’ of the heterosexual nuclear family: ‘[t]here is a 
particularly dangerous situation when the biological family is unstructured, the father 
is absent from the daily life of the children and the mother shows great emotional and 
professional instability’.74 The statement suggests that, without a father, the family is 
unstructured and that, without his support, the mother is unstable. The reasoning of 
                                                        
70
 ibid 45 and 57. Under Austrian law in force at the time, transferring the child’s custody to the Youth 
Welfare Office was possible only if this option was not available.  
71
 ibid 70-1. 
72
 ibid 70. Austrian law did not exclude foreigners from admission to mother-child centres.  
73
 Soares de Melo v Portugal (n 47) 41. 
74
 ibid 47. Author’s translation.  
  13 
the domestic courts shows that, despite longstanding feminist critiques,
75
 the societal 
aspiration ‘to complete the “family” by the addition of a man’76 remains very much 
alive. Susan Boyd has shown how women may be penalised in child custody 
assessments for failing to live up to normative motherhood: ‘a “good” mother will do 
so in the context of a heterosexual, nuclear family model’.77  
Similar borders associated with normative motherhood play out in the last case 
examined in this part: Zhou v. Italy. This time, the expectation is that a woman will be 
‘selflessly available to her children, taking primary care of them’.78 Zhou exemplifies 
how, though formal borders may be absent, other borders may still work to the 
detriment of migrant women. The applicant was a Chinese national and single parent 
living and working full time in Italy.
79
 It is unclear from the facts of the case whether 
she was living there legally. After day-care arrangements made by social services had 
failed, the applicant entrusted the care of her son to a couple in the neighbourhood 
while she was at work.
80
 Social services disagreed with her choice of this couple and, 
without exploring further arrangements, reported the situation to the public prosecutor 
who in turn requested the opening of adoption proceedings.
81
 Her son was placed for 
adoption, following an expert opinion declaring her incapable of exercising parental 
role.
82
 The expert concluded that the applicant’s parental inability was due to a health 
condition developed during her child’s delivery and to her lack of time to care for 
him.
83
  
In finding a violation of her right to family life, the Court condemned the 
Italian authorities for not having made adequate and sufficient efforts to respect the 
applicant’s right to live with her child.84 The State, according to the Court, should 
have taken measures to preserve the family link.
85
 The Court accepted that the 
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applicant was incapable of caring for her son and that her care inability was partly due 
to her health condition.
86
 It noted, however, that the Italian courts should have helped 
her overcome the difficulties by means of adequate social assistance
87
 and that the 
experts should have examined the possibility of improving her childcare ability.
88
 
Framed in these terms, the applicant’s parental inability is narrowly understood as 
arising exclusively from personal difficulties and the demands on the State as 
demands to ‘fix’ an individual inability.  
Looking at Zhou through the lens of intersecting borders allows seeing that the 
applicant’s care inability was more broadly shaped by structural factors to which the 
State had contributed. The factors include practical borders inherent in the lack of 
family to count on for childcare and, as stated above, normative expectations about 
women’s role in the family. The two borders interact to construe the applicant as 
incapable of exercising her parental role and therefore as unfit to raise her child. 
There are several indications in the case that Zhou had no one to leave the child 
with.
89
 In assessing the applicant’s situation, the domestic authorities ignored the 
impact of the lack of social or family support on her childcare capacity. In so doing, 
and like in Haydarie and Moser, the authorities reinforced the disadvantage created 
by these borders for the individual. As noted before, a complete and objective 
evaluation of the individual circumstances should consider the negative implications 
of this practical border. In addition, and as argued in Moser, States may be asked 
another procedural obligation: to evaluate all available support measures before 
radically breaking up the family.  
While the practical border is ignored in the domestic assessment of Zhou’s 
situation, the normative border is enforced. The expert conclusions, on which the 
Italian courts relied to place the child for adoption, signal gendered expectations about 
women’s place and role in society. Zhou, according to the expert, was not capable of 
caring for her child in part because she ‘had no time to look after the child because of 
her work’ (‘elle n’avait pas le temps de s’occuper de l’enfant ̀ cause de son 
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travail’).90 Informing this conclusion is the gendered division of labour that expects 
women to stay home and undertake the primary role of childcare. Zhou is thus 
punished (her child is taken away from her) for transgressing normative motherhood: 
she is a ‘bad’ mother for placing work above childcare. Feminist critiques of child 
custody decisions in other jurisdictions have shown how ‘the ideal mother stereotype 
continues to play a role in favouring the “home-sphere” mother, which forces a 
woman to either adhere to the stereotype or risk losing her child’.91  
Both in Zhou and in Soares de Melo, the normative borders enforced by the 
domestic decisions implicitly consist of gender stereotypes that express and reinforce 
women’s inferiority in relation to men. Women are respectively considered as 
belonging in the home-sphere and as morally suspect without a male partner. 
Moreover, the stereotypes informing the domestic assessments of the applicants’ 
parental role are not innocuous. They serve to cast the applicants’ relationship with 
their children as deficient and to justify the drastic removal of their children. 
International human rights law has already recognised that subordinating stereotypes 
cannot justify interference with human rights.
92
 Allowing States to rely on these 
stereotypes would imply accepting that discrimination is a legitimate objective for 
States to pursue.
93
 Evidence of harmful stereotypes in domestic assessments of 
parental capacity may lead to additional violations of non-discrimination. States may 
not only be required to refrain from harmfully stereotyping in the individual case. 
They may be additionally demanded positive obligations to eradicate stereotypes in 
domestic decision-making.
94
 The latter type of demand, especially, holds a 
transformative potential because it requires working towards dismantling 
discriminatory normative borders.
95
  
Normative borders, however, may not always consist of stereotypes that 
(re)produce the subordinate status of certain groups in society. Think of the above-
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discussed borders of nuclear family as proper family in Soares de Melo or paid work 
as ‘real’ work in Haydarie. They do not reflect discriminatory attitudes in and of 
themselves and may not necessarily be illegitimate to maintain. Yet these borders are 
not neutral: they reflect dominant cultural expectations that may have disparate 
consequences on those who fall short of such expectations. As seen earlier, then, 
States may be asked to either justify reproducing this kind of normative borders or to 
mitigate their disparate impact on some individuals and groups.   
 
4. THE BORDERS BEHIND INDIVIDUAL ABUSE AND INDIVIDUAL 
VULNERABILITY 
 
This part discusses two high-profile cases to illustrate how, viewed through the lens 
of intersecting borders, abuse and exploitation of migrant women are not seen as the 
mere result of individual abusive behaviour. Nor are they seen as the exclusive 
product of the individual victim’s vulnerabilities. Instead, abuse and exploitation are 
understood as shaped by the complex interaction of structures that the State may 
create, reproduce or reinforce.  
 
4.1. BEYOND THE EVIL EMPLOYER  
 
The first case, Siliadin v. France,
96
 offers an opportunity to reflect on how formal and 
practical borders may engender exploitation conditions and on how normative borders 
may negate State protection against exploitation. Siwa-Akofa Siliadin, a Togolese 
woman, arrived in France with a tourist visa when she was fifteen years old to work at 
a couple’s home until her plane ticket had been repaid and her migration status 
regularised.
97
 In reality, however, she became an unpaid domestic worker.
98
 The 
couple ‘lent’ her to another couple, for whom she carried out home care and childcare 
tasks for several years without payment, without identity documents, without a day 
off, and in poor living conditions.
99
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The Court ruled that the French law had not offered her effective protection 
due to the lack of provisions specifically criminalising forced labour and servitude,
100
 
both of them prohibited by Article 4 ECHR. The Court looked at the applicant’s age 
and migration status to assess whether her situation amounted to forced labour. In 
establishing whether she worked under ‘the menace of penalty’ – one of the features 
characterising forced labour in international labour law
101
 – the Court concluded that 
her situation was equivalent:  
 
She was an adolescent girl in a foreign land, unlawfully present on French 
territory and in fear of arrest by the police … Mr and Mrs B. nurtured that 
fear and led her to believe that her status would be regularised.
102
  
 
The Court’s references to the applicant’s unlawful presence, fear of arrest and 
promise of regularisation of her status signal the operation of formal borders. Though 
in the judgment there is hardly any information on the French immigration rules, let 
us assume for the sake of the argument that the French State restricted legal migration 
routes for domestic workers thereby producing a high level of irregularity in the 
sector.
103
 Human rights scholars have discussed the links between immigration norms, 
irregularity in the domestic work sector, abusive employment conditions, 
deportability, and limited access to State protection.
104
 The deportability associated 
with ‘illegality’105 acts as ‘a formidable obstacle’ to demanding protection against 
abuses
106
 and further reinforces migrants’ vulnerability to abuse.107 As a migration 
scholar notes, ‘[p]recarious work for those working illegally is not simply at the whim 
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of individual employers, but structurally produced by the interaction of employment 
and immigration legislation’. 108  Attention to the role of immigration norms has 
enabled some human rights scholars to suggest State obligations capable of 
addressing the disadvantaging effects of these norms. Stoyanova, for example, 
proposes that States adopt a regulatory framework that enables migrants to report 
abuses to the authorities without risking deportation.
109
  
The Court’s reasoning in Siliadin further signals the operation of a practical 
border: minimal social networks to count on for support.
110
 In determining whether 
the applicant’s services amounted to servitude, the Court says:  
 
As a minor, she had no resources and was vulnerable and isolated, and had 
no means of living elsewhere than in the home of Mr and Mrs B. … She was 
entirely at Mr and Mrs B.'s mercy, since her papers had been confiscated 
and she had been promised that her immigration status would be regularised, 
which had never occurred.
111
  
 
Isolation and no means of living elsewhere are among the circumstances that, in the 
Court’s view, prevented the applicant from changing her situation and therefore 
turned her services into servitude.
112
 Family and friends might have enabled the 
applicant to break the isolation and dependency underpinning her servitude. As seen 
earlier, though States do not create this kind of practical border, they may reinforce it 
by ignoring its negative impact on the women concerned. Again, acknowledging this 
reinforcing role is important because it allows thinking about possible mitigating 
responses. These responses may include procedural ones such as taking into account 
the role of this practical border in reinforcing domestic workers’ dependence when 
designing responses to labour exploitation.  
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A third border operating in Siliadin is ‘the normative assumption that 
women’s primary work is in the home’.113 Lurking behind the low value given to 
domestic work in many societies
114
 are perceptions that this work flows ‘naturally 
from women’s genetic endowments rather than knowledge and skills acquired 
through education’.115 From the information available in the Siliadin judgment, it is 
hard to tell whether domestic work enjoyed such a low societal value and legal 
protection in France. Yet the reasoning of one of the domestic courts reveals that 
these gendered views of domestic work played out in the particular case. The 
Versailles Court of Appeal concluded that the applicant had not worked in conditions 
incompatible with human dignity because ‘carrying out household tasks and looking 
after children [is] the lot of many mothers’.116 Implicit in this statement is, like in 
Zhou, the kind of normative border that naturalises ‘women’s roles within the 
reproductive sphere as housekeepers, maids, and caregivers’.117  
Siliadin, however, was not threatening but upholding this normative border. 
Contrary to Zhou, she was carrying out ‘women’s work’. Her conformity to 
normative borders serves to naturalise her alleged exploitation and to undermine her 
access to justice. The Versailles Court of Appeal does not see the exploitative 
conditions in which Siliadin worked because it assumes that her tasks are in any event 
the kind of tasks women carry out in their houses. The assumption that carrying out 
housework and child care is, or ought to be, women’s role in the family blinds the 
French court to the fact that Siliadin was performing these tasks for someone else’s 
children without payment. The normative border implicitly works to close off any 
investigation into her actual work conditions and, ultimately, to legitimise her work as 
free and exploitable. As discussed in Zhou and Soares de Melo, normative borders 
consisting of stereotypes such as this should be considered illegitimate reasons to 
restrict human rights and lead to analysing the case as one of discrimination. 
Additionally, recognising these borders and their role in undermining women’s equal 
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access to justice may lead to demanding States preventive obligations such as judicial 
training to combat harmful stereotypes.
118
  
 
4.2. BEYOND THE EVIL TRAFFICKER
119
  
 
The last case discussed in this article, Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia,
120
 exemplifies 
how normative and formal borders may intersect to reflect and reinforce power 
imbalances between (female) migrant workers and their (male) employers. Combined, 
these borders sustain the inequalities that may give rise to exploitation and other 
abuses.
121
 The case, moreover, shows how formal borders may create regular routes to 
enter, reside, and work within a State territory albeit precariously and unsafely.   
Rantsev concerned the death, under suspicious circumstances, of Oxana 
Rantseva,
122
 a Russian woman admitted to Cyprus to work in a cabaret on an artiste 
visa.
123
 Following Cypriot immigration policy requiring prospective employers to 
procure the visa for artistes,
124
 the owner of the cabaret where Oxana Rantseva was 
going to work obtained an artiste visa on her behalf.
125
 A few days after she started 
working, she tried to escape but was tracked down by her employer who took her to 
the police and requested her detention and deportation for being ‘illegal’. 126  The 
police established that she was not ‘illegal’ and asked her employer, who was 
considered ‘responsible for her’, to pick her up. 127  Cypriot immigration policy 
required cabaret managers to report to the migration authorities if artistes did not 
show up for work or breached the contract otherwise.
128
  
The Court found, among other human rights violations, that Cyprus had 
breached Article 4 ECHR, which it read as prohibiting human trafficking.
129
 It 
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critiqued the artiste visa scheme for not offering ‘practical and effective protection’ 
against trafficking and exploitation.
130
 It also reproached the Cypriot authorities for 
failing to take measures to protect Oxana Rantseva despite ‘a credible suspicion’ that 
she might have been trafficked or exploited.
131
 The Court’s Article 4 ECHR reasoning 
turns full attention to the role of formal borders in encouraging abusive employment 
relationships for female migrant artistes. The Court finds unacceptable measures 
encouraging cabaret owners ‘to track down missing artistes or in some other way to 
take personal responsibility for the conduct of artistes’.132 Moreover, it considers that 
one of the main police failures was asking the employer to collect Oxana Rantseva 
instead of releasing her.
133
 In interrogating formal borders, this kind of reasoning thus 
spotlights one of the mechanisms encouraging trafficking and exploitation in Cyprus: 
strong dependency of artistes on their employers.
134
 The reasoning illuminates how 
formal borders may structure migrant women’s employment relations unequally and 
precariously.
135
  
A normative border further sustains the formal border in Rantsev. Contrary to 
the previously examined cases – where the domestic authorities’ language signals 
normative borders – in Rantsev these borders are more difficult to recognise.136 
Feminist scholars, however, have thrown light on these borders by applying an anti-
stereotyping approach,
137
 an approach that may help identify many but not all 
normative borders. Informing both the requirement that the agent procured the artiste 
visa, and the police understanding that the artiste was under the agent’s custody was 
the gender stereotype of women as ‘the (sexual) property of their employers’.138 The 
immigration requirement and the police attitude suggest that ‘the agents in this system 
are the (male) cabaret owners and not the women themselves’.139 The immigration 
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rules requiring cabaret owners to deposit money in a bank to cover artistes’ possible 
repatriation expenses
140
 further reinforce the view that the former ‘owned’ the 
latter.
141
  
Unlike in most of the cases examined up until now – in which normative 
borders inform domestic authorities’ decisions – in Rantsev normative borders 
underlie immigration policy itself. Moreover, the normative borders are practically 
enforced through the police attitudes discussed above. Looking at Rantsev through the 
intersection of formal and normative borders reveals the State’s contributory role to 
the exploitation of migrant artistes in two ways: by formally establishing a strong 
dependency on their employers and by normatively reproducing their 
commodification (women as objects managers can dispose of).  
One important implication flowing from seeing Rantsev through the 
intersecting borders lens is that the problem is not framed as one of an individual 
abusive employer or trafficker. The problem, instead, is understood as partly shaped 
by immigration policy and cultural attitudes that render more than one woman 
vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation.
142
 Framing the problem more broadly 
allows for envisioning responses beyond criminal punishment of individual 
perpetrators. In fact, in Rantsev, the ECtHR frames positive obligations quite broadly. 
These obligations are aimed not just at punishing traffickers and protecting victims 
but also at preventing trafficking.
143
 One of the obligations asked by the Court 
actually interferes with State immigration control prerogatives. State immigration 
rules, the Court notes, ‘must address relevant concerns relating to encouragement, 
facilitation or tolerance of trafficking’. 144  This kind of demand may push States 
towards transforming those formal borders at the root of vulnerability to 
trafficking.
145
 Formulated in such broad terms, the demand in principle leaves States a 
margin to decide how to address these concerns. In circumstances like those of 
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Rantsev this could mean amending the artiste visa scheme so as to unwind artistes’ 
dependency on their employers.
146
  
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
In launching the notion of intersecting borders of inequality, this article has sought to 
draw attention to three types of borders that may disadvantage migrant women in 
enjoying human rights: formal, normative and practical borders. Rather than claiming 
that these are the sole disadvantaging barriers migrant women may face, the article 
hopes to invite reflection on other borders.  
Through the lens of intersecting borders of inequality the bad things that 
happen to many migrant women are no longer viewed as the mere result of individual 
choice, vulnerability, failure, abuse, or misfortune. These bad things are understood as 
shaped by constraining practical realities, by normative expectations about family, 
parenthood and sexuality, and by immigration norms that produce unequal power 
relations. In essence, the notion of intersecting borders facilitates understanding that 
the disadvantages migrant women may face are not simply individual but structural.  
Focusing on the borders that cross us rather than on who crosses these 
borders
147
 may further help recognising the inequalities that other individuals or 
groups standing at similar intersections may experience. One can perfectly imagine a 
migrant man trapped in the kind of circumstances Siliadin was trapped because of 
formal and practical borders: dependence on an employer for regularising his 
migration status and absence of family networks to turn to for support. Imagining a 
non-migrant woman in the same circumstances as Zhou is not hard either. An Italian 
single mother who moves to another part of the country may find herself without 
family to count on for day care support and be expected by the authorities to give up 
her work to take care of her child.  
Emphasising the borders that burden some but not others also encourages 
imagining responses that may go beyond ‘fixing’ the individual. Some of these 
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responses may hold a transformative potential. Think of State obligations to work 
towards eradicating harmful stereotypes from domestic decision-making by, for 
example, training decision-makers. Think also of the kind of State obligation 
articulated by the ECtHR in Rantsev: address immigration norms that encourage, 
facilitate or tolerate trafficking. Other State obligations may more modestly seek to 
prevent or mitigate – substantively or procedurally – the detrimental implications of 
borders for certain individuals. Mitigating obligations come to mind specially to 
address the disadvantages caused by practical borders that States have not directly 
contributed to or by normative borders that States may legitimately sustain. Haydarie, 
for instance, offers an occasion to reflect on how States may be demanded a 
procedural duty to address these borders: to take into account the limitations caused 
by language barriers and unpaid care work on an individual’s job-seeking efforts.  
Dismantling borders of inequality may not always be possible. States do not 
necessarily create practical borders such as those arising from insufficient family or 
social networks. Normative borders, in turn, are deeply ingrained and normalised in 
society. They are therefore difficult to recognise, let alone change. At times, 
normative borders operate discreetly, even silently, and certainly diffusively across 
the kind of domestic decisions that tend to escape attention: those of administrative 
bodies and lower courts. Even those normative borders that may be easier to spot 
given the use of discriminatory language (for example, the coupled motherhood 
border used to question Soares de Melo’s morality) cannot be dismantled overnight. 
Demolishing these borders requires deep changes in dominant cultural attitudes. 
Transforming formal borders comes with a different set of challenges, as immigration 
control is considered ‘a central substantive aspect of sovereignty’.148 The tensions 
between international human rights law and State sovereignty take on a particular 
dimension in the context of migration.
149
 In this area, human rights do not only 
challenge ‘States’ relative jurisdictional independence from international authority 
[but also] States’ plenary territorial powers’.150  
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The role of supranational human rights courts like the ECtHR in addressing 
the borders of inequality is actually limited, if not marginal. In fact, as Haydarie 
exemplifies, a supranational human rights court may reproduce and reinforce these 
borders. It is thus vital to ‘remain realistic and somewhat skeptical about the 
importance of any law, national or international, in achieving social change’. 151 
Scepticism, however, does not mean that attention to formal, normative and practical 
borders is futile. Attention to these borders may not just discourage (international 
human rights) law from reproducing and reinforcing disadvantage. It may encourage 
(international human rights) law to remain alert to its potential to fix these borders 
and to seize opportunities to comprehensively tackle disadvantage within this 
potential.   
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